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1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Recent yeazs have seen a proliferation of work seeking to modify the notion of Nash
equilibrium as originally defined (Nash, 1950). There have beEn two main strands. The
firet larger strand coasists of attempta to refine the notion of Nash equilibrium so as to
reduce the sometimea lazge number of equilibria. Among these is the notion of perfectnesa
due to Selten ( 1975). "Trembling hand" perfectness can be viewed as an e~cpression of
slight uncertainty about whether one's opponents will actually chooae their Nash atrategies.
This strand culminates, perhaps, in the varioua notions of stability in which the behavior of
opponents and payoffs are effectively assumed to be possibly slightly uncertain. (See
Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986.) The aecond much smaller atrand relaxes the hypothesis
underlying Nash equilibrium that each player's belief about an opponent be consistent with
the opponent's behavior. Instead a hierarchical structure of beliefa is permitted which has
the effect of enlarging the set ofequilibria. ( See Pearce, 1985, and Bernheim, 1985.) The
present work considers the effect of uncertainty about the informational structure of the
game while retaining the asaumptions of known payoffs and rational behaviour in the usual
preciae Nash sense for all playera.
Although the existence of uncertainty about the atructure of a game seems as
inherently plausible as uncertainty about payoffs or the behavior of opponents, it is much
more open~nded. That is, the range of alternative perturbed structuree for a given
N-person game, with a complicated sequential structure, perhapa, may be rather lazge. In
the interesta of greater apeáficity, then, attention is limited to two-pereon nonzero~um
gamea with simultaneous moves. In this case, there would appeaz to be a natural candidate
for the informationally perturbed game. This models the slight poasibility that each
player's choice of pure atrategy be found out by the other before that second player's choice
ia made. The perturbed game here models the effect of alight uncertainty about the
strategic aequence of movea. The associated refinement is denoted aa an "informationally
robust equilibrium", IRE for short.
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The following section containa a formal treatment of this refinement procedure. It
ie shown indeed that an "informationally robust equilibrium" can be defined for a general
class of two-person nonzero-sum games. Furthermore it is shown that the set of
informationally robust equilibria must be non-empty and a subset of the set of Nash
equilibria. The mathematical tractability of the notion of an informationally robust
equilibrium is a theoretical point in its favor. Such tractability would also facilitate
application of the concept in contexts where the informational perturbation seema
appropriate.
The conatruction of an informationally robuat equilibrium ie loosely reminiacent of
"trembling hand" perfectnesa, at least with a finite number of pure atrategies. However,
informational robustness does not imply perfectness. Indeed, a dominated etrategy may be
used in an informationally robust equilibrium. This happens because such a strategy may
be attractive to a Stackelberg leader, deapite being dominated.
It might be useful to informally analyze an example at thia point. Example A ia
taken from van Damme (1983, p. 14) and is given in Figure 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
The Nash equilibria, NE, here are (u,l) and (d,r) but only (u,lJ is normal form
perfect. Indeed, "u" is a dominant atrategy for 1, as ia "C' for 2. However, 1 would choose
"d" rather than "u", if 1 were a Stackelberg leader, given that 2 broke the resultíng tie in
1's favor. Similarly, 2 would choose "r" rather than "l" if the roles were reveraed. Suppose
there were instead only a small probability that either player's pure atrategy would be
revealed to the other prior to the second player's choice, with the most likely event being
eimultaneous choice. Player 1, for example, must then choose one strategy taking into
account the posaibility that it will be revealed to player 2 before 2's choice has to be made,
as well as the likelihood of simultaneoue choice. Tbia will then turn (d,r) into a strict
equilibrium of the perturbed game, roughly speaking. (Abstracting, that is, from choices
made as followers. Ties should contínue to be broken as before.) Hence, although
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"d" and "r" are dominated in the game with aimultaneous movea, they are not dominated
in a plausible informationally perturbed game.
Section 3 conaiders in greater detail the relationship between informational
robustness and perfectnesa. It is shown that atrict equilibria of a game with a finite
number of pure strategies are both informationaily robuat and perfect. Example B then
completes the demonatration that there ia no logical relationship between the two
refinements. It also showa that there may be no equilibrium which ia both informationally
robuat and perfect.
Section 4 ia a review of the rather acanty literature which relates directly to the
present paper.
What moral should be drawn from thia diacuasion of two-person nonzero-sum
gamea with eimultaneous moves? In the case of gamee with more than two playere or with
non~imultaneous moves, it was already noted that the difficulty with the present
procedure is not that there ia no plauaible informational perturbation but that there are
many. No attempt ia made here to analyze auch general games. However, the moral of
thia paper is intended to be that the perturbation- informational, behavioral or
whatever- which ahould be used for a particular game cannot be uniquely given in the
abstract. To argue auch an essentially negative view, it is enough then to focus on
two-peraon nonzero--sum games. Then there is a salient and mathematically tractable
informational perturbation to conaider, as an alternative to the behavioral perturbation
underlying períectnesa. Section 3 proves, moreover, that the asso~ated refinement is
fundamentally distinct from perfectnesa. There may be no escape in the end from the need
to tailor the perturbatioas considered to the context.
2. DEFINITION, EXISTENCE OF AN IRE
Thia section is devoted to a proof that a wide class of two-peraon nonzero-sum
gamea, where moves are simultaneous, muat possess an "informationally robuat
equilibrium", or IRE, for ahort. Thie clasa ia large enough to include many gamea of
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economic interest which have a continuum of pure strategies, Cournot duopoly for e.zample.
The clasa ia given as:
Definition 1: Simtdtaneow Move Gatna, G
A game with aimultaneous movea ia given as
G - ((Si,Ui)~i-1,2)
where Si are the pure atrategy apaces, assumed compact metric spaces, and where
Ui: Sl x S2 ~ R i-1,2
aze continuous functiona representing the payoffs.
As usual:
Definítioa E: Miud Strategies of G
The sets of mixed atrategies for the game G are defined as
Mi -{set of probability measures on Borel seta of Si}, i-1,2
and the correaponding expected paqoffs as
Vi(ml,m2) s J Uidm, i-1,2, for mi E Mi, i-1,2
where m- ml . m2 is the unique product probability measure induced by ml and m2 on
Sl k S2, (See Bartle, 1966, Ch. 10.)
Remarkt. Billingaley (1968) shows that M1 and M2 are compact metrizable spacea with
the topology of weak convergence. (See pp. 7-8 and Theorem 6 of the Appendix, p. 240.
Thia topology can be induced by the "Prohorov" metric, as ia ahown pp. 237-238.)
Pazthasarathy (1967, p. 57, Lemma 1.1) ahows that Vi(ml,m2) are continuoua functions on
M1.M2,i-1,2.
Thie etructure sufficea to establish exiatence of a Nash equilibrium, or NE, in mixed
strategies.
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?7uortm 1: Esisttace of a Naah Equfliórànm for G
Any game G, as in Definition 1, has an NE in mixed strategies, as in Definition 2.
~ s
That is, there exists (mI, m2) E MI x M2 such that
Vl(ml, m2) ? Vl(ml, m2), Vml E Ml and V2(ml, m2) ~ V2(ml, m2), Vm2 E M2
PaooF Glicksburg (1952) proves a etronger version of this, where the pure etrategy
sets aze merely compact Hausdorff spaces.
Now consider the definition of the perturbed game which models the preaence of
uncertainty concerning the order of moves.
Definition 8: Perturbed Game, G(el,e2)
For each game G, as in Definition 1, a perturbed game, G(el,E2), say, is given as
follows. The first move ia nature's. She selects "1" with probability el ~ 0, "2" with
probability E2 ~ 0 and "0" with probability 1-el - e2 ~ 0. If "1" is selected, player 1's
choice of pure strategy ia revealed to player 2 prior to player 2's choice. Similazly, if "2" is
chosen, then player 2's choice of pure strategy is revealed to player 1 prior to his choice. If
"0" is chosen, no revelation takes place. In addition, player 1 cannot discriminate between
states "0" and "1" and player 2 cannot discriminate between "0" and "2". The payoffs are
then, eay, for i- 1, 2,
Ui(81~82,f1(82)~~(BI)) - El Ui(alrf2(BI)) f (1-EiEZ)Ui(81,62) i- E2Ui(fl(82)~BZ)
where sl E Sl is the choice made by player 1 in statea "0" and "1" and fl: S2 ~ SI is a
function repreaenting the etrategy of player 1 for atate "2" when the choice of s2 E S2 ia
observed. Similar definitions apply for player 2.
The construction of the perturbed game ia represented diagramatically in Figure 2.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
It ia desired to establish now that G(cl,f2) has an equilibrium in a suitable sense.
s
To this end:
Definition .(: Btat Repliea
Define the best-reply correspondences
RZ:S1 ~ S2, R2(81) -{82~U2(81,82) ) U2(81,82) V82 E S2}
R1:S2 -~ S1, Rl(82) -{81 ~ Ul(81 ,82) ~ Ul(sí,s2) veí E Sl}
Since S1 and S2 are compact, and Ul and U2 are continuous, it follows that Rl and R2 are
nonempty and upper hemicontinuous. (See Berge, 1963, p. 116, "Maximum Theorem").
Now:
Dtfinition 5: Subgamt Ptrfect Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept for G(el,e2) is taken to be that of subgame perfect
equilibrium or SPE. (This definition extends that given by Selten, 1975, for finite games.)
Such an equilibrium is a 4-vector (m1,m2,fl,f2), where ml E M1, m2 E M2, f1:SZ ~ S1 and
~ ~ s
f2:S1 -. S2. It is required 5rst that fl and f2 are measurable functions satisfying
~ ~
fl(e2) E Rl(s2), fZ(el) E R2(el), d 82 E S2, V sl E S1.
i s
Ezpected utility, given fl and f2, for each ml E M1 and m2 E M2, is:
Vi(ml,m2,fl,f2) - f U~(sl,s2,f1(s2),f2(sl))dm, where m- mlxm2,
is the unique product measure induced by ml and m2 on S1xS2 and where Ui are given in
~ e
Definition 3, for i- 1, 2. (Since fl and f2 aze measurable, all these integrals exist.) It is
secondly required that
Vi(ml,m2,fl,f2) ~ VÍ(ml,m2,fl,f2), for all ml E M1,
VZ(ml,m2,fl,f2) ~ V2(ml,m2,fl,f2), for all m2 E M2.
s s s s
That is, (ml,m2) is a Nash equilibrium given (fl,f2).
A useful auxiliazy step in the construction of such an SPE is:
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De~miiion 6: Tie-Br~eaking Ruk
The tie-breaking rule is that, for example, player 2 breaka ties in favor of 1. That
is, player 2 chooaes among hia best repliea one which ma~mizea player 1's payofí. A
aimilar requirement holds with the roles reversed. To be precise:
f2(sl) E arg max U1(sl,s2) and fl(s2) E arg max U2(sl,s2),
e2 E R2(sl) sl E Rl(s2)
respectively. Since S1 and S2 are compact metric spaces and Rl and R2 are upper
hemicontinuous, auch functions f2 and fl eust ae "measurable selectiona". ( See Wagner,
1977, p. 880, Theorem 9.1(ii).) Hellwig et al (1990) diacusa the role of euch tie-breaking
rulea for games of perfect information.
This implies:
Lemma 1: Redueed Forna Game, g(El,e~
Given a perturbed game as in Definition 3 and the use of the tie-breaking rule as in
Definition 6, it follows that the perturbed game G(el,e2) ia equivalent to a"reduced form
game" with eimultaneous movea givea as
g(E1rE2) - ((Si~ui)~i-1r2)
where the Si are as in Definition 1. That is, the payoff function U~, as in Definition 3, now
dependa only on (sl,s2), and is given as:
u~:S1KS2-~R,i-1,2.
Furthermore, ui is upper semicontinuous in (el,s2) and continuoua in ej, i~j, i, j- 1,2.
PtooF Since player 2 breaka ties in favor of player 1, as in Definition 8, it follows
that 1's payoff in state "1" ia a function of sl only given by, say,
Ui(sl) - U1(el,~(sl)) - Max U1(81,82)
a2 E R~(sl)
where this is upper aemicontinuous in sl. (Berge, 1963, p. 118, Theorem 2.) On the other
hand, 2's payoff in state "1" ie also a function of sl only, given by, say,
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U2(Bl) - U2(81,~(el)) - MS U2(81,82)
2 z
and this is a continuous function of sl ( Berge, 1963, p. 118, "Maximum Theorem").
Similaz observations hold for the analogous U2(s2) and UF(s2).
Now the payoffs, as in Definition 3, can be rewritten as, say,
ui(el,s2) - ElUi(el) f( 1-EiE2)Ul(el,s2) f E2Ui(s2)
ll2(s1,e2) - ElU2(el) f(1-EiE2)U2(81,62) f E2U2(62)
and the stated continuity properties are immediate.
Now:
Theorem t: F.~ivteace of an NE for g(El,E2) and an SPE fur G(El,E2)
(a) The game g(El,E2), as in Lemma 1, hae a NE in mixed strategiee, ae in
s s
Definition 2. That ie, there exiats (ml, ml) E Ml x M2 eatisfying:
vi(ml, m2) ? vi(ml, m2) , dml E Ml v2(ml, m2) ? v2(ml, m2) , Vm2 E M2.
where expected payoffs are now, for i- 1, 2, for all ml E Ml and m2 E M2,
vi(ml,m2) - J u~(Bl,s2)dm.
Here, m- ml. m2 is the unique product measure induced by ml and m2 on S1MS2 and the
upper aemicontinuity of u~ implies its integrability.
(b) The game G(El,E2) hae an SPE, a6 in Definition 5.
Psooe (a) See Robaon (1990a). Lemma 1 eatabliehes the propertiee of the payoff6 needed
to apply "Theorem 1". Note that Glicksburg (1952) cannot be applied here since the
payoffa need not be continuous in pure atrategies.
~ s ~ s
(b) It is easy to check that a suitable SPE, as in Definition 5, is (ml,m2,fl,f2)
where (fl,f2) satisfy Definition 8, and where (m1,m2) is then the NE of g(El,E2) from (a).
Ramark Definition 6 is not logically needed to prove that an SPE exista. It is simply
convenient to show there is an SPE with thi6 property.
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Now:
Dc~nition 7: Inforn~siionsQy Robwt Equilibrnm IRE
s s
A atrategy pair (ml,m~) is an "informationally robuat equilibrium," or IRE, of G if
and only if there exiata aome aequence of pairs (el(n),E2(n)) and an asaociated seqnence
(mi,m2,fi,f2), aay, of SPEs of G(EI(n),E2(n)), aa in Definition 5, such that
(el(a),EZ(n)) ~ 0 and (mi,m2) ~(ml,m2), as n~ m.
The main reaYlt ia then:
Theorem 9: Esiatence of IRE es Refinement ojNE
s t
Any game G aa in Definition 1 has a mixed atrategy pair (ml,m2) which ie an IRE,
as in Definition 7. Furthermore, any IRE is also a NE of G, ae defined in Theorem 1.
PYOOF Conaider any sequence c(n) -(El(n),e2(n)) ~ 0 aa n-. m. By Theorem 2, the
game g(el(n),E2(n)), as in Lemma 1, has an NE, (mi, m2) E Ml . M2, say, for all n. Thia
forms pazt of an SPE of G(El(n),e2(n)), as in Definition 5. Since Ml and M2 aze compact
metrizable apaces, it follows without losa of generality that there exists a limit point of thia
~ s
sequence of NE, (ml,m2), say, which is then sn IRE of G.
s ~




for some mi E M1, where VI ia aa in Definition 2. Suppoae, indeed,
s s r
VI(mi,m2) - VI(ml,m2) - b0 1 0
By Definition 7, there exista a aequence (Fl(n),E2(n)) and a sequence (mi,mZ,fi,f2), say, of
SPEa of G((el(n),e2(n)), such that
(EI(n),E2(n)) ~ ~ aIId (mi,m2) ~(ml,m2) 8S n ti m.
io
Since Vl is continuous, as noted following Definition 2, 3 Nl 3 n~ Nl implies
~ vl(mi,m2) - vI(ml,m2) I ~ o and I vl(m1,m2) - vl(mí,m2) I ~ o
Hence
~Vl(mi,m2) - Vl(mi,m2)~ -
I [vl(mí,m2)-vl(ml,~)1 f [vl(ml,m2)-vl(ml,m2)1 f [vl(mi,m2)-vl(mi,m2)11
15~-~-~-3~~0.
(Note the inequality ~ AfBfC ~? I B I-IA I-I C ~.) Now, from Definitions 2 and 5, it is
not hard to show that:
~ vi(ml,m2,fl,f2) - vl(ml,m2) I s(El f EZ)(Ub - Ui)
where Definition 1 implies the e~stence of the upper and lower bounda for Ul on S1YS2
given as Ub and Ui respectively. Hence 3 N2 such that n 1 N2 implies
~ vi(n)(ml,m2,fl,f2) - vl(mi,m2) I ~ o,
uniformly in (ml,m2,fl,f2). Hence n~ max(N1,N2) implies that
~ Vi(n)(mi,m2,~,~) - Vi(n)(ml,m2,~,~)~ -
I {[vi(n)(ml,m2,~,~)-vi(mí,m2)1 t [vl(mí,m2)-vl(mi,m2)1 f
[vl(mi,m2)-vi(n)(mi,m2,~,~)1} I
~3~-~-~-~~0.
(Recall ~ AfBfC ~ ~ ~ B ~-~ A ~-~ C ~. ) Thie contradicts the requirement that
(mi,m2,fi,f2) be an SPE for the game G(el(n),E2(n)). QED.
3. INFORMATIONAL ROBUSTNESS AND PERFECTNESS
The first result is that the requirements of informational robuetness and perfectnesa
need not conflict.
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Lemma t. A Sbict Eqailibrium u nn IRE
Suppose the game G, as in Definition 1, has a finite number of pure atrategies for
each player. Suppoae G also has a strict equilibrium, which must then be in pure
strategies. (That is, each player's Nash strategy is the unique beat reply to the other's.
This usage is as in Fudenberg, et al., 1988.) This equilibrium is then "informationally
robust".
PaooF Simply note that the atrict equilibrium of G muat be a(atrict) equilibrium of
g(E1,E2), as in Lemma 1, if (El,e2) is amall enough.
Remark. Fudenberg et al (1988) observe that a atrict equilibrium is indeed
"hyperstable" as a singleton set, where hyperatable is as in Kohiberg and Mertens (1986).
The following 2M2 e~cample is then auíficient to ahow that whether an equilibrium is
informationally robuat is logically independent of whether it ie perfect. It indeed ahowa
that a dominated atrategy may be used in an IRE. (Example A of the introduction also
showed thia in an informal way.) Hence such an IRE is a member of no "stable aet" as
defined by Kohlberg and Mertens, violating their requirement of "admissibility". In
addition, Example B shows that it is not possible to resolve this conflict by requiring both
informational robustness and perfectness.
Example B is given in Figure 3.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
Here, it is a dominant atrategy íor 2 to choose "r" and (u,r) is the unique normal form
perfect equilibrium. However, there ia a continuum of Nash equilibria in mixed atrategies
of the form
{((1~~),(q,l-q))~q E f~, ~1}~
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so that 1 plays "u" ïor sure and 2 plays "C' with probability q. Hence the perfect
equilibrium is at one end of this continuum. It will be shown that the unique IRE is at the
other end of the continuum and thus is:
((1,0),(1~2,1~2)).
The only tie induced for the follower in either state "1" or state "2" occurs when player 1
chooses "u". However, player 1 is also then indifferent as to how this tie is brokea. The
reduced form game associated with Example B is then unique and is as in Figure 4.
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE




where p is the probability that player 1 chooses "u" and q is the probability that 2 chooses
"C'. Cleazly,
(P~q) ~ (1~1~2)~ ~ (f1~E2) ~ 0~
as required.
Example B has an NE which is an IRE but not perfect, namely ((1,0),(1~2,1~2)),
which indeed uses the dominated atrategy "C'. It also has an NE which is perfect but not
an IRE, namely (( 1,0),(0,1)), and a range of NE which are neither. Since Lemma 2
exhibits a class of NE which aze both IREs and perfect, the logical independence of the two
concepts follows. Finally, Example B clearly has no equilibrium which is both
informationally robust and perfect.
4. RELATED LITERATURE
There is little other work which considers alterations in the informationai structure
of a game. Two exceptions aze noted here.
Matsui ( 1989) considere a supergame in which there is a slight possibility that one
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player's entire strategy will be disclosed to the other before the game itself is played. This
is shown to imply that only Pazeto effiáent outcomes can be sustained as equilibria. There
is no analogous result here. (Consider the simplest 2.2 co-ordination game, for example,
with two strict Nash equilibria, where one Pazeto dominates the other. Both are then
IREs.) Supergames are at once more special and more complicated than need be the case
here.
More closely related is an independent informal paper by Rosenthal (1989). He
considers two-person nonzero-sum games, given in normal form. He then investigates the
question of which Nash equilibria are "commitment-robust" in the sense of being invaziant
under either of the transformations of the game which designate one player as Stackelberg
leader and the other as follower. It is the mixed strategy of the leader rather than its
realization which is revealed to the follower in these transformed games. (This is
reminiscent of the approach of von Neumann and Morgenatern, 1947, to two-person
zero-eum games.) Rosenthal pointa out that a Stackelberg leader may wish to use a
strategy whích is dominated in the original simultaneous move version of the game. He
dces not consider any argument involving perturbations of the original game analogous to
that here. (The original version of the present paper also considered the poesibility of
mixed strategiea being revealed, but considered perturbed games otherwise similar to those
here. See Robson, 1990b, also.) Finally, whereas there is a quite general existence result
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